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MOTION/CASE IS RESPECTFULLY REFERRED TO JUSTICE

INDEX NO. 653975/2016

NYSCEF DOC. NO. RECEIVED NYSCEF: 08/24/2016

# SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK **NEW YORK COUNTY**

Answering Affidavits — Exhibits	PRESENT: ANIL C. SINGH  Justice	PART <u>45</u>
SEQUENCE NUMBER: 001 STAY ARBITRATION  The following papers, numbered 1 to, were read on this motion to/for		INDEX NO
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Notice of Motion/Order to Show Cause — Affidavits — Exhibits		MOTION SEQ. NO.
Answering Affidavits	The following papers, numbered 1 to, were read on this motion to/for _	
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IECK IF APPROPRIATE: SETTLE ORDER	FCK IF APPROPRIATE:	SUBMIT ORDER

FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 09/01/2016 11:31 AM

NYSCEF DOC. NO. 28

RECEIVED NYSCEF: 09/01/2016

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2	SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK		
3	COUNTY OF NEW YORK: TRIAL TERM PART 45		
4		X	
5	JOHN TARPINIAN,		
6	Plaintiff,		
7	- against -		
8			
9	Defendant.		
10		x	
11	Index No. 653975/2016	1.7.7	
12	August 24, 2016 60 Centre Street		
13	New York, New York 10007		
14	B E F O R E: THE HONORABLE ANIL C. SINGH, Justice.	-	
15	APPEARANCES:		
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25	Terry-Ann Volberg, CSR, CRR Official Court Reporter		
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THE COURT: Good afternoon, counsel.

MR. RICHAN: Good afternoon, your Honor.

MR. SPARER: Good afternoon.

MR. MEISSNER: Good afternoon.

THE COURT: In this special proceeding the petitioner, John Tarpinian, moves by order to show cause for a permanent stay of arbitration with respect to claims raised by the respondent, in an arbitration pending before FINRA.

So I will hear first from the petitioner.

MR. RICHAN: Thank you, your Honor.

Do you wish that I remain seated?

THE COURT: I have no preference.

MR. RICHAN: I will stand.

Good afternoon, your Honor.

This is the mysterious case of the plaintiff who doesn't want her day in court. Her own --

THE COURT: She wants her day in arbitration.

MR. RICHAN: A very different forum, your Honor. Her own preference is not notwithstanding this matter, this dispute, does not belong in FINRA arbitration.

To either the alleged conduct arose out of

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the business of the parties, or did not arise out of
the business of the parties, or if it did, it falls
under the sexual harassment federal and state statutes,
and all you have to do --

THE COURT: Before we get to that, isn't there a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress?

MR. RICHAN: Yes.

THE COURT: Why would that necessarily fall within the sexual harassment?

MR. RICHAN: Because the cases hold that it is subsumed in the statutes because the statute provides for that relief.

THE COURT: So the threshold issue here, in my view, and when we discussed this some weeks ago as to whether or not your client participated in the arbitration, you have, as I recall, 45 days from the time the petition was filed to serve an answer. So more than enough time to come into court to seek a permanent stay of arbitration pursuant to CPLR 7503.

You chose not to do that. Why?

MR. RICHAN: Well, first of all, let me correct the time line. The statement of claim was filed on April 8th. We obtained a letter from FINRA claiming that they served it on my client on

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April 15th. As a matter of fact, my client was not served with the statement of claim. An acquaintance of him saw a posting on Mr. Meissner's website boasting about his filing of this FINRA arbitration against my client, and my client got wind of that, and my client hired counsel in Boston, and counsel in Boston contacted FINRA, and it wasn't until May 4th or 5th that we actually got the statement of claim. So the seven week time line is not accurate.

THE COURT: Fair enough.

Accepting that, you still have an option, right? You have two options. One, you could proceed -- three options -- one, you could proceed to arbitration; two, could you contest whether or not the issue was arbitrable by bringing a special proceeding before the Supreme Court or as you did in your case, you contested whether or not the issues were subject to arbitration before the director of FINRA.

MR. RICHAN: The reason for that, your Honor, is because the director of FINRA, he doesn't hear the merits of the case, but he is authorized to deny FINRA jurisdiction.

THE COURT: If he believes that the suit shouldn't be arbitrated.

MR. RICHAN: That's correct.

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THE COURT: So why then when he chose to make that determination and the director denied your application should I give you a second bite of the apple?

MR. RICHAN: Because there is no evidence, there is no record before the director what he considered, whether it's just a default that we accept anything by --

made a motion. Your adversary opposed and you replied.

So that's the record. Your position was that the conduct had nothing to do with business activities.

Your adversary's response was, well, that's not accurate, Mr. Tarpinian was a owner or partner of Newport Coast Securities, and that the based on certain overrides, Tarpinian received, I think, 30 percent of commissions earned by Presumably the arbitrator considered all of that in making the determination that the issue was subject to arbitration.

MR. RICHAN: We have no idea, your Honor, what the director --

THE COURT: But by going or making the application before the arbitrator didn't you, didn't you put your client at risk that an arbitrator would

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say yes or no as opposed to coming to court where there would be a full record as we are making now?

MR. RICHAN: That's a distinction -- we did not put it before an arbitration panel or arbitrator, we put it before the director. The director makes administrative-based decisions.

THE COURT: So your position is that because it's the director, it's technically not part of the arbitration process?

MR. RICHAN: We did not participate in the arbitration the way the courts have ruled what participation is. Specifically, including the cases cited by my adversary, the courts repeatedly say if you continually reserve your rights and protest jurisdiction, they allow all kind of things, ranking of arbitrators, filing of an answer --

making is what, is that because we made an application to the director, we didn't participate in arbitration, presumably if you made it to the panel, then it would be a different result?

MR. RICHAN: My, and I think it's a correct read of all of the cases, the concern over participation is that you don't want parties monkeying around, arbitraging between arbitration and court on

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the merits. That's not what we are doing. We don't want to present the merits to the panel, and we have not. All we want to do is get this in the proper forum.

THE COURT: Is that really accurate? Take a look at your answer. Tell me whether or not your answer contains any affirmative defenses on the merits.

MR. RICHAN: It contains affirmative defenses, you are correct.

THE COURT: So then is that an accurate statement that you are not attempting to get a decision on arbitration on the merits?

MR. RICHAN: Let's put it this way, if this was truly an answer on the merits, we would have said a heck a of a lot more than is in the answer. That answer is barebones. It says more about reserving or as much about reserving rights as it does about anything substantive on the merits.

I also want to point out to your Honor, there is no real prejudice to the respondent for us having gone to the director first. We get two bites of the apple, so does he. The two bites of the apple in the cases that he cites, that's about the merits. That's about people participating for eight months, nine months, in arbitration, then saying, oh, on the eve of

hearing, literally that's one of the cases, on the eve of the hearing, after they set hearing dates, agreed to hearing dates, they so, oh, we want to go to arbitration. That's not what we did. We clearly reserved our rights and emphatically from day one.

And I think the court also has to look at the underlying merits, and that is that this clearly does not belong -- FINRA arbitrations are supposed to hear a battery of cases. I mean, to the extent this does arise out of the business, his allegation -- her allegations and characterization of the allegations, they track the federal statutes. It's exactly what FINRA was talking about, this kind of case. We don't want these kind of cases.

THE COURT: Okay. Go on. Anything else?

MR. RICHAN: Not for now, thank you.

THE COURT: Counsel.

MR. MEISSNER: Thank you, your Honor.

I want to thank the court for accommodating my tentative disability.

THE COURT: Hopefully it's for a short time.

For a lawyer not being able to hear, that's a bad
thing.

MR. RICHAN: Or speak.

MR. MEISSNER: I am getting packing taken

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out tomorrow.

In any event, I just wanted to focus in on the facts here. First of all, it was approximately four months before the petitioner decided to come to court. I don't know if there is an eight month cutoff or six month cutoff. It wasn't two weeks.

THE COURT: Counsel's position is that, in fact, his client was never served, and so that it took the natural course of time for it to work its way out.

MR. MEISSNER: I heard that, but there is no affidavit saying that. That's counsel's representation.

The facts here are simple. Instead of a couple of days before the deadline of filing their answer, they instead decided to go to the director of FINRA to seek a decision from him preventing us from pursuing the arbitration in that forum. They chose a forum to make that argument.

THE COURT: What about counsel's point that they went to the director, it's not as if they went to the arbitration panel to argue the case on the merits, they went to the director who had authority under the FINRA's rules to say yea or nay to whether or not the dispute was subject to arbitration?

MR. MEISSNER: I don't think that makes a

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difference. I think under the law it is the same thing. I will get to that.

But just so it's clear, they litigated that, several submissions, went back and forth. They lost. When they lost, what did they do? They filed their answer. As you noted, it was not just reserving rights. There were affirmative defenses in there. And then what did they do? Did they come to court then?

No, they sat back and waited to get the arbitrator list so we can see who would be the potential arbitrators on this case. I think that is significant because that narrows who will be on this case.

And then they decide to come to court after they got the list. They came and asked for a temporary stay that was denied by your Honor. I think your Honor suggested if they wanted to go to the Appellate Division for an emergency stay, they can. They decided not to do that. They decided to just go back to FINRA, ask for an extension in time, which is fine, they could ask for it. That was denied. And they didn't, again, didn't go to the Appellate Division, they went and filed their arbitrator selections.

These are all decisions being made. This is not, you know, oh, my G-d, we forgot to get a stay from the Appellate Division. They took all of those steps,

and then --

THE COURT: Any steps they took after the TRO -- any steps they took after I denied the TRO, they were forced to do that, right? It wasn't --

MR. MEISSNER: Well, they could have appealed.

THE COURT: They could have gone to the Appellate Division. They got boxed in a corner as a result of me not granting a TRO.

MR. MEISSNER: They had about ten days before the arbitrator selections had to be put in.

Instead, they are sending letters to FINRA. Again, they could have sought a stay. In fact, I think it was a little, not this counsel, but misleading to FINRA in stating what your Honor's decision was in asking for the extension. I think at the end of the day there is controlling authority here.

THE COURT: Let's talk about the issue. The issue is whether or not the petitioner in this proceeding participated in the arbitration by making the application with respect to arbitrability to FINRA.

MR. MEISSNER: Right. I believe, I submit that, your Honor, there is controlling authority from the Court of Appeals here in a case cited by both sides, although not clearly because it is right on

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point on this particular case, these particular facts and this particular issue, and that's the Kidder, Peabody v. Marvin case, which the petitioner cited to, to support that there is no waiver. However, if you read the case, which I urge the court to do, it appears this case is controlling. I am going to read one paragraph from that case if I may. That's 161 Misc.2d 12. "Neither party" -- I stand corrected. It's a Supreme Court case, not Court of Appeals. "Neither party informs the court --"

THE COURT: When you say Supreme Court?

MR. MEISSNER: New York County, Judge Crane.

"Neither party informs the court whether
Smith Barney has answered a statement of claim. It is
petitioner's burden to establish that it did not
participate in arbitration. Whether or not," I am
reading from page 1015, "Whether or not Smith Barney
filed an answer, however, it did seek from a director
of arbitration the same relief it now seeks from the
court, dismissal of respondent's claim as barred by
NASD Section 15." NASD is the predecessor of FINRA.
"Indeed, Smith Barney was successful in part of that
application given the structure of the NASD arbitration
procedure and the role of its director of arbitration,
this activity of Smith Barney is not different in

substance than the actions of petitioners who ask the arbitrators themselves to recognize their contentions of non-arbitrability. This action alone that Smith Barney took some six months before moving in court to stay arbitration suffices to establish a waiver of the right to litigate."

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I think it's right on point, your Honor.

It's the same exact action. On that basis, I think it's pretty clear.

THE COURT: So your position is I should follow the Supreme Court case as being persuasive authority?

MR. MEISSNER: Yes. I think obviously we have multiple other arguments in our papers which we rely on, but with regard to the threshold issue, I think it's pretty clear here.

THE COURT: Okay.

Counsel.

MR. RICHAN: I just want to again, going back to participation, first of all, the Kidder case, in that case the director, in part, granted some of the relief they were seeking. I don't know whether there was a reasoned decision or not.

THE COURT: So your concern there is whether there was a reasoned decision, right? But don't you

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take that risk whenever you make a motion to an arbitrator that you are going to get just yes, no, granted, denied, and is it incumbent upon you then to make a decision? This is what may happen before the arbitrator or I can go into court where the judge is obligated to put his or her reasons for granting or denying the petition, and then I have a remedy, I can go to the Appellate Division, et cetera, et cetera.

MR. RICHAN: I can't tell you what, I am not passing the buck, I can't tell you what Boston counsel was doing when they submitted the letter to the, arguments to the director, but I will tell you that the cases, other than this one quote, the cases are concerned with active participation where somebody is trying to game the system so they can go as far as they want in arbitration, see what result they get, then if they don't like, it they can —

argument here, that your predecessor counsel went, made a motion before FINRA to see what result they could get, and then if the result was not what they wanted, they could come back to the Supreme Court and make the same application again?

MR. RICHAN: I mean, that's true. That is true. That's what he did.

THE COURT: Well, when you say that's what

he did --

MR. RICHAN: That's what we did.

THE COURT: -- what occurred?

MR. RICHAN: That's what occurred, yes.

THE COURT: Wouldn't that same argument hold

here?

Mr. RICHAN: We don't believe it does. We don't believe that's a fair adjudication of this important threshold issue. We are not participating on the merits. We have vehemently protested to participate on the merits.

By the way, this notion that we sat back and waited for the arbitrators selection list to come see what we got, the arbitrators, potential arbitrators selection list had 31 names on it. We had to pick three. The arbitration panel was three. The notion that we waited to see a list of 31, and, by the way, FINRA picks them anyway so we really would have had to wait to see who was on the panel, not who's on the arbitration selection list. That's just misleading. So I don't think that should weigh at all because we did not do that. We did not sit back, wait to see what would happen when the list came.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

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Anything else, counsel?

MR. RICHAN: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: On April 8th, 2016 the respondent, filed a statement of claim with FINRA alleging that she's a financial advisor registered with FINRA for 17 years. Further, that in January 2015 was recruited to join Newport Coast Securities in New York. She met with members of the firm including respondent, John Tarpinian, who told her that the person she was supposed to meet was no longer with the firm, but that he would speak with her as "partner/owner."

The parties allegedly engaged in a conversation regarding personal matters, and subsequently Tarpinian advised Austin that an offer letter was being put together, and that she would be part of his team.

The petition goes on to allege that Tarpinian made it clear that she would be on his team. As a result, Tarpinian would receive a 30 percent override from Austin's commissions which as of October 2015 amounted to the sum of \$56,000.

Austin in the arbitration proceeding seeks damages for sexual harassment and abuse arising out of two incidents. She alleges that on February 12, 2015

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and April 15, 2015 Tarpinian forced her physically to engage in unwanted sexual contact. Subsequently she reported the abuse to a compliance officer at Newport Coast Securities. Tarpinian was allegedly banned from the office and thereafter left the company.

In the petition seeks compensation for Tarpinian's alleged abuse and damages for severe emotional distress. Rather than commencing a special proceeding in Supreme Court seeking a stay of the arbitration, Tarpinian on May 27, 2016 moved before the director of arbitration to dismiss the arbitration contending that the claims do not arise from any business activity which is a predicate for arbitration under FINRA's code of arbitration procedure. Further, it was the position of Tarpinian that the code excludes claims for sexual harassment from mandatory arbitration. And, finally, it was Tarpinian's position that he did not agree to submit this matter to FINRA arbitration.

claims arose out of business activities of Tarpinian
who was alleged to be a partner or owner of Newport
Coast Securities receiving a 30 percent override from
commissions earned. Further, it was the
position of that Tarpinian had used his position

to physically abuse her.

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Tarpinian replied again arguing that business activities were not alleged as this was a private dispute with no connection to activities regulated by FINRA.

The director of FINRA's office of dispute resolution denied the motion to dismiss by a communication dated July 15, 2016.

On July 21st, 2016 Tarpinian filed his answer with FINRA denying the allegations of sexual harassment and abuse as well as damages. His first affirmative defense was that there was no agreement between the parties to arbitrate the matter. The second defense alleges that the statement of claim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The third defense alleges lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In his fourth defense Tarpinian alleges that the claims are barred by the doctrine of laches and waiver or estoppel. The fifth defense alleges that Austin did not suffer any harm based on the actions of John Tarpinian. The sixth defense asserts that the conduct that complains of was consensual or welcomed and was not undesirable or offensive. The seventh defense asserts that has failed to mitigate her damages. The eighth defense alleges that the claims are barred

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by the statute of limitations. The ninth affirmative defense maintains that Austin has failed to join necessary parties.

In this court's view this case is controlled by the First Department's decision in Flintlock

Construction Services, LLC v. Weiss, 122 A.D.3d 51

[First Department 2014] where the petitioner sought a permanent stay of arbitration of claims of punitive damages. The motion was first made to the arbitration panel which denied the application without prejudice.

Thereafter, the petitioner moved before the Supreme Court to permanently enjoin the arbitrator from awarding punitive damages.

The First Department affirmed the lower court's denial of the petition noting at page 54 as follows, "Petitioner's motion to stay the arbitration should be denied for the further reason that they have participated in the arbitration precluding late resort to CPLR 7503(b). CPLR 7503(b) authorizes motions to stay arbitration by parties "who have not participated in the arbitration." Petitioners participated in the arbitration process for nearly eight months selecting arbitrators, participating in preliminary proceedings before registering an objection to the arbitrability of respondent's claim for punitive damages. Even then

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petitioners chose not to move to stay the arbitration, but to make a motion to dismiss the claim squarely placing the issue of arbitrability and availability of punitive damages before the arbitrators. Having chartered their own course, in the words of the motion court, they cannot now avail themselves to the mechanisms set forth in CPLR 7503(b).

Now in my view although there are some factual distinctions between Flintlock and this case, the Flintlock arbitration proceedings were go going on for several months, here Tarpinian's litigation strategy was to submit the dispute of arbitrability to the director of FINRA's office of dispute resolution rather than making a motion for a permanent stay pursuant to CPLR 7503. Not only did counsel put the issue of arbitrability affirmatively before FINRA, Tarpinian then interposed an answer which in addition to preserving his arbitrability defenses also raised affirmative defenses on the merits that what occurred between the parties was consensual and did not cause any harm to In short, Tarpinian's answer seeks to do more than reserve his rights.

On this record I hold that Tarpinian participated in the arbitration, first, by putting the issue of arbitrability before FINRA, and then, second,

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answering on the merits, and may not now resort to seeking a stay of arbitration pursuant to CPLR 7503(b).

So for these reasons, the petition to stay arbitration is denied, and the parties are directed to proceed forthwith with arbitration in accordance with the rules of FINRA.

This decision constitutes the order and judgment of this court.

Thank you, counsel.

MR. MEISSNER: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. RICHAN: Thank you, your Honor.

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#### CERTIFICATE

I, Terry-Ann Volberg, C.S.R., an official court reporter of the State of New York, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate transcript of my stenographic notes.

Terry-Ann Volberg, CSR, CRR Official Court Reporter.

So ordered

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Sept 1, 2016